Role of Family Firms to Uplift the Financial Performance and Investment Opportunities of Listed Manufacturing Firms of Pakistan by Zulfiqar, Muhammad et al.
             European Online Journal of Natural and Social Sciences 2019;                                                            www.european-science.com 
                Vol.8, No 3 pp. 439-458 
                ISSN 1805-3602 
 
Openly accessible at http://www.european-science.com                                                                        439 
 
Role of Family Firms to Uplift the Financial Performance and Investment 
Opportunities of Listed Manufacturing Firms of Pakistan  
 
Muhammad Zulfiqar1, Muhammad Kashif Khurshid2, 
Sadeen Ghafoor3*, Aamer Saleem4 
1 School of Accounting, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian China; 2Department 
of Management Sciences National University of Modern Languages, Islamabad; 3 College of  
Commerce, Government College University Faisalabad, Pakistan; 4 Children Hospital,  
Faisalabad, Pakistan 
*Email: ssadeenghafoor22@yahoo.com 
 
Received for publication: 14 November 2018. 
Accepted for publication: 15 June 2019. 
 
Abstract 
This study is conducted to analyse the relationship of Ownership Structure with Firm Per-
formance in non-financial companies listed at Pakistan Stock Exchange during the period 2008 to 
2013. The basic focus of this study was related to the performance of family firms as compared to 
non-family firms. The distinction between both types has been explained in literature with the help 
of definitions given by different authors and scholars. Keeping in view the research aims and objec-
tives the non-financial sector of Pakistan is taken as population. Simple random sampling technique 
is used in accordance to research requirements and extracted a sample of 120 firms for the purpose 
of analysis. All these firms are listed at Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX). Investment Opportunities 
(Tobin’s Q), Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) have been used as a proxy vari-
able to explore the firm value and firm’s financial performance. Sophisticated data analysis tech-
niques such as descriptive, correlational, panel data regression analysis have been used. Results 
showed that Family firms are negatively correlated and Non-Family firms give better performance. 
On the basis of results obtained through data analysis it is concluded that Firm Performance criti-
cally depends on Managerial Ownership. Panel data analysis has shown that firm leverage and size 
has no relationship with proxy variables while remaining independent variables have significant re-
lationship with performance variables. Agency problems arise due to increase in Managerial Share-
holdings in Pakistani context, which ultimately affects the performance of the firms.  
Keywords: Family Firms, Non-Family Firms, Family Control, Firm Value, ROA, ROE, To-
bin’s Q 
 
Introduction 
In today’s highly competitive and dynamic business environments it has become vital to un-
derstand the factors which contribute towards the financial performance of the firm and enhance the 
firm value. In this regard the ownership structure of the firms has gained the interest of the scholars 
in recent years. Many recent studies such as Massis and Kotlar (2015); Zattoni, Gnan and Huse 
(2015); Wagner et al. (2015); Hussain and Shah (2015); Tahir, Sabir and Shah (2016) have also fo-
cused on ownership structure and many other variables related to company features to evaluate the 
impact of family firms on financial performance of the company. In this regard researchers have 
done a remarkable work in countries other than Pakistan while in Pakistan this issue has not been 
addressed in detail. Firms’ efficiency relies on both properly designed and recommended ideal 
choices taken on the part of the business owner or result of a positive growth that occurs and mostly 
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both are unavoidable. However, there is a list of important aspects that are continuously noticed al-
lowing a company to outshine their competitors in the most aggressive sectors. For example, one 
such crucial factor is the possession framework which impacts the firm’s possibilities to sustain and 
enhance its efficiency in the future. Scientists have been enthusiastic about examining the part and 
effect of possession components on the result of companies with regards to its efficiency and value. 
In growing financial systems like Pakistan and Indian family ownerships are popular. 
Researchers have been enthusiastic about examining the part and effect of possession com-
ponents on the result of companies with regards to its efficiency and value. In growing financial sys-
tems like Pakistan and Indian family ownerships are popular and getting improved attention from 
the researchers who are analyzing the company efficiency in this perspective. In this regard pioneer 
research works were conducted by Jensen & Meckling (1976); Fama & Jensen (1983); Fama & Jen-
sen (1985). 
Mixed views are found in literature regarding the family control in businesses. According to 
Barontini and Caprio (2006) many close relatives companies are highly regarded because many of 
the large corporations have thrived under the same close relatives for decades. Family companies are 
successful concept and many of the large companies have started as close relatives owned corpora-
tions. Famous close relatives’ empires in Pakistan include Nishat group, Dewan group, Sitara group, 
and Ibrahim group and many more. This type of long-term commitment is something that many as-
sociate with close relatives control but also the devotion that many families have in the companies 
that they invest in. But there have been some discussions that families and other shareholders may 
have different interests that could prevent value accumulation and growth in the company (Barontini 
& Caprio, 2006). 
Past studies have contrary results that could imply that factors beyond close relatives man-
agement might be involved, e.g. structural differences between markets and regions. Dyer (2006) 
verifies the contrary results by comparing nine researches that examine company efficiency and 
close relatives’ management on companies across Europe and the USA. Dyer (2006) argues that one 
cause of the difference between results in past research is that the research fails to determine close 
relatives members impact from other variables. 
To examine if there is a significant “family-effect” on firm performance on the Pakistani 
market we will look at the following questions; do firms with family ownership majority have an 
effect on firm performance? What measure is a good tool for detecting the effect of performance in 
family firms? 
Theoretical Background 
There are many concepts about the favor and against viewpoint of efficiency in family firms. 
Dyer (2006) presents family associates factors impacting great compared to low company efficiency 
where the principal-agency concept has a central role. If the providers (managers) and the major 
(owners) have different goals the broker expenses will be serious, although this is not exclusive to 
see relative associates companies. Jensen and Meckling (1976) discuss that family associates com-
panies are likely to have lower organization cost because the entrepreneurs and the supervisors in 
family associates companies often are the same. The organization expenses are the expenses of the 
tracking of the providers by the fundamentals, and they increase when the company develops. Since 
the need of tracking by the proprietor is not an issue when proprietor and administrator are the same 
person, the organization expenses will not be a problem in founder-led companies. However, family 
associates members control of the administrator could be a reason for higher, or equally great, or-
ganization expenses as non-family companies due to the variations in the interest of close relatives 
in managing roles (Schultze et al., 2001). 
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To continue the part of administrator control, Burkart et al. (2003) present a design of man-
aging sequence in a company possessed and managed by its creator where the creator chooses (1) 
between hiring an experienced administrator or leaving control to its family associates and (2) on 
what portion of the company to drift on the inventory industry. The two paradigms of corporate 
government are combined in the single design of managing succession: the Anglo-Saxon design of 
the issue between the investors and the administrator and the second design of the issue between lit-
tle and big investors. The background of the decision of the creator is according to Burkart et al. 
(2003) shaped by the degree of lawful security of community investors and shows an effects of how 
the creator should decide maximum sequence and ownership structure. When the lawful security of 
community investors is strong, the maximum solution for the creator is to seek the services of the 
best expert administrator and sell off the entire company in the inventory industry due to minimiza-
tion of the organization issue between the administrator and little community investors. With ad-
vanced security of community investors, the creator should still seek the services of an experienced 
administrator, but due to the advanced security of community investors the creator or its enfant must 
remain on as huge investors to monitor the administrator. When the security of community investors 
is weak, the organization issues are too serious to allow for separating of possession and control and 
in this case the beginning family associates must remain and run the company. 
Significance of Study 
This study check the performance of family and non-family firms, this is really important 
point because Family-owned listed companies are the backbone of Pakistan’s economy. But in Pa-
kistan scholars have not attained much attention about the performance of family and non-family 
owned firms. This study helps the existing shareholders and new investors to understand the perfor-
mance of family and non-family firms and how ownership structure impact on firm performance. 
They will be able to know the difference between family and non-family firm performance. It will 
be supportive for management and investors for future decision making. It will be future guidance 
for finance researchers.   
The scholars had given different results in different economies about the performance of the 
family and non-family firms as discuss above. The contribution of this study investigate the perfor-
mance and value of family and non-family firms in Pakistan economy, And investigate the result, 
family firms are better perform or non-family in Pakistan non-financial sector. This study explores 
the impact of ownership structure on firm performance. This study also explores the performance of 
family firms when the company is still run by its founder or by the descendants in Pakistan. 
The objective of this study to investigate the impact of ownership structure on firm financial 
performance and investigate which ownership structure gives superior performance, family firms or 
non-family firms. It is also explored the performance of family firms when the company is still run-
ning by its founder or by the descendants and investigate the different determinants of financial per-
formance of family and non-family firms in Pakistan. 
Problem Statement 
The family controlled businesses are less productive as compared to non-family controlled 
businesses (Barth et al., 2005). Families may be unhelpful to firm performance, analyses of U.S. 
public companies indicate that family firms outperform (Miller et al., 2007). Similarly, the study 
conducted by PWC (2012) was found that family businesses are more productive due to different 
facts such as in family firms the interest of the owner in decision making increases because his/her 
own money is invested in the business. The same case is observed in the study conducted by Zattoni 
et al. (2015). They evaluated the impact of family firms on financial performance and found that 
family involvement has positive impact on the firm performance. While, Kachaner, Stalk and Bloch 
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(2012) concluded that family firms are not productive as compared to non-family firms because the 
focus of the family firms is Resilience instead of Performance. In the light of these contradictory 
results the researchers wants to evaluate which results are valid in Pakistan’s non-financial sector. 
Since the family controlled businesses occur everywhere in the globe, and family owned 
businesses are very much common. Same as in Pakistan family owned businesses are very much 
common. Family-owned, listed companies are the backbone of Pakistan’s economy (Yasser, 2011). 
Ownership structure has a great importance for any firm. Family business firms’ effect on perfor-
mance of the firm is increasing many folds. The scholars had given different results in different 
countries about the performance of family and non-family owned firms. According to the literature 
mostly scholars had concluded the non-family firms gave the superior performance but some scho-
lars had concluded the family firms gave the superior performance. This study explore that what is 
the actual scenario in the context of Pakistan’s listed manufacturing firms. Which type of ownership 
structure leads to superior financial performance? Either that is family ownership structure or non-
family ownership structure. 
The rapid rising industry owned by family controlled firms can be confirmed by the study of 
Faccio and Lang (2002) where in this study shows that 44 percent firms comprised as a sample of 
their study were family owned. Family controlled firms can lead a firm to outperform non-family 
firms for primarily two motives. The first is, administration of family controlled firms make healthy 
decisions for the investment because the managers of family firms have more particular information 
and knowledge and are therefore more visionary and having most better and long-term investment 
philosophies. The second is, administration of family firms can reduce the dishonorable principal-
agent problem, as it helps in bring into line the incentives of management with the hopes of the 
shareholders. To meet the main objectives of this study, the effect of ownership structure on firm 
financial performance investigated.  
 
Literature Review 
A fundamental question in the finance literature is what determines firms’ capital allocation. 
In a frictionless setting, a firm’s investment should be determined only by its investment opportuni-
ties as measured, by (Tobin, 1969) and (Stein, 2003). In terms of the dependent variable, Tobin’s q 
is used as a proxy for investment opportunity (Abor and Bokpin, 2010). Tobin’s q perfectly reflects 
a firm’s investment opportunities (Hayashi, 1982, Erickson and Whited, 2011, Peters and Taylor, 
2017). 
Family Firms 
A family firm can be defined as a business having 2 or more than 2 family members holding 
majority of the ownership of the company. In this study two major categories of firms i.e. family 
owned firms and non-family owned firms are made. The study has used the following criteria for the 
qualification of a firm as a family business firm. At least 33% shares are held by a family or major 
shareholding in a company belongs to single family 
According to Barth et al. (2005) when one person in a company or one family in a company 
having at least 33% shares it is called a family firm. Barontini and Caprio (2005) consider Family 
firm if the biggest shareholder claims no less than 10% of possession rights and either family or big-
gest shareholder controls more than 51% of direct voting rights or controls more than the twofold of 
the immediate voting privileges of the second biggest shareholder. Different definitions utilized: 
Firm keep running by family COO/Firm keep running by non-family COO yet one relative is 
ready/Family firm when originator or descendent of organizer runs firm. Cronqvist and Nilsson 
(2003) Founder families might include only a sole particular person or possibly a strongly knit gang 
of people that tend not to participate in exactly the same family. Some other descriptions utilized: 
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Founder family ownership is usually ownership with the president or maybe descendants on the 
president and families/individuals associated with your president.  
Berle and Means (1932) raised the first voice on the relationship of ownership structure and 
firm performance. They supposed that firm value is systematically different from corporate owner-
ship structure. They showed that no significant relationship between accounting profit rate and own-
ership structure. Their results also showed that, no evidence available on control separation and 
ownership. At the same time Demsetz and Lehn (1985) showed opposite association among pattern 
of shareholdings and firm performance. 
In last 30 years, lots of studies have been done on family firm’s performance. The literature 
clearly shows there is big difference between family businesses and non-family businesses in several 
ways e.g. payments of dividend, succession of control, borrowing and investment strategies. Lyman 
(1991) studied that the family firms give more and better consumer facilities and participation, have 
larger concern with the satisfaction of firm employees, and family firms protect for backgrounds and 
customs also provide bigger chances to women. But at the other side, family firms look several 
problems e.g. problems when decisions done jointly, succession matters, family employees supervi-
sion etc. Although maximum number of small and medium type businesses all over the world are 
family owned businesses, according to literature these types of businesses are also rapid growing 
and effective firms. But at the same time some studies shows that family owned businesses face sim-
ilar problems and matters and have almost similar interest, so these types of results discussed above 
are almost same in all countries of all over the world. 
Within corporate governance research, lot of researcher’s analyze and mainly focus on the 
impact of family owned firms on corporate governance (Anderson & Reeb, 2003).  Family firms has 
been focused on ownership structure and the voting rights, in the vein of Berle & Means (1932) and 
Jensen & Meckling (1976), may be increased performance. Yet the classic representation of a family 
firm proposes that these organizations having problem from capital restrictions, favoritism, man-
agement entrenchment, inter-generational squabbles and, all of these elements may reduce from 
their performance (Allen & Panian, 1982). Hence, it is a main observed question that is effect on 
performance of the family ownership firms. Moreover this is main observed question must be come 
up to carefully because endogeneity in ownership modeled by (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). 
 
Ho = Performance of family firms is equal or better than that of non-family firms. (> =) 
H1 = Family firms show inferior performance than non-family. (<) 
 
Founder Firms vs Descendant Firms 
Family firms can be divided into two categories i.e. founder and descendant. According to 
Andres (2011) a company is referred as a founder firm if it is organized by a founder CEO. If 
founder is deceased and the firm is controlled by one of founder’s descendent then it is labelled as 
descendant firm. In data set the study labelled the responses as “0” and “1” where “0” represents the 
non-family firm while “1” represents the firm being either founder or descendent.  
Perrini, Rossi and Rovetta (2008) conducted research on Italian market any covered the year 
from 2000 to 2003. In this study the researchers found that non-family owned firms give superior 
performance as compared to family owned firms. They also found that better and superior perfor-
mance of the firms encourage and lead the outside investors. Barzegar and Babu (2008) the re-
searcher do study on Tehran Stock Exchange, for this purpose using 50 companies data listed in this 
market and covered the period from 2001 to 2003. They shows that concentrated ownership firms 
give inferior performance as compared to diffused ownership firms. Families may be unhelpful to 
 
Muhammad Zulfiqar, Muhammad Kashif Khurshid,Sadeen Ghafoor, Aamer Saleem 
 
 
Openly accessible at http://www.european-science.com                                                                   444 
 
firm performance, analyses of U.S. public companies indicate that family firms outperform (Miller 
et al., 2007).  
Ali, Shah and Jan (2015) have investigate the relationship between ownership structure and 
firm performance on 355 firms listed in Karachi Stock Exchange Pakistan use. The study uses two 
dependent variables Tobin’s Q for the market based performance and Return on Assets (ROA) for 
accounting based performance and use leverage as moderating variable, the other control variables 
are size of the firm and growth of firm. Study investigate that ownership structure has significant 
with market based firms and also shows that insignificant relation between ownership structure and 
accounting based performance. Moreover study explore that leverage has not moderating effect on 
relationship among ownership structure and firm performance. 
Al-Najjar and Kilincarslan (2015) explored the impact of ownership structure of on dividend 
policy and took analysis on listed firms in Turkey. In this study the scholars checked the main effect 
of dividend and give low attention on effect of family control. Study used the panel data of 264 
listed firm in Turkey Stock Exchange in non-financial and non-utility sector. In this study results 
showed that state ownership and foreign ownership connected with a less possibility of paying divi-
dends and the ownership variables like minority shareholders, family involvement and domestic fi-
nancial institutions having insignificant relationship with the probability of paying dividends. While 
all other ownership variables showed negative and significant relationship with dividend yield and 
dividend payout.  
Arosa et al. (2010) analyzed and investigated the relationship between board of directors and 
performance of the firm. They also used Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) for 
the measurement of profitability. Family firm, generation managing the firm, ownership concentra-
tion and family ownership concentration are the independent variables. Size of the firm, sale growth, 
leverage and firm age are used as a control variables. They select sample 586 Spanish non-listed 
firms and used data for the year 2006. For this purpose the researcher acquire data from non-listed 
family firms in Spanish market. They used panel data and explored the relationship among perfor-
mance of the firm, affiliated proportion and in board’s dependent directors. They shows that affi-
liated director’s having favorable effect on performance of the firm. 
 
Ho = Founder firms & Descendant firms have equal performance. 
H1 = Founder firms & Descendant firms have unequal performance 
 
Ownership Concentration 
Ownership Concentration is defined as how many percentage shares have by one family. 
Family firms also included CEO, his spouse and children. This variable based on real percentage of 
having shares by one family. Due to real percentage of ownership result become more authentic and 
clear.   
A positive first-generation effect, if confirmed, would be consistent with recent findings of a 
value premium in founder-CEO firms relative to other firms (Palia and Ravid, 2002). It would also 
be consistent with the finding of negative abnormal returns to the appointment of family descen-
dants as managers Smith and Amoako-Adu, 1999). 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2017) family firms are those firms that are run by the founders of the 
company. In other definitions if the founder family not run but the founder family hired the profes-
sional team. Anderson and Reeb (2003) Family Corporation if there exists fractional collateral prop-
erty from the founding family and/or the reputation of family members offering for the mother board 
of owners. Various other explanations utilized: Proportion of snowboard seats held by family mem-
bers to be able to mother board chairs presented by impartial directors/CEO inventor implies any 
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founding family corporation if the CEO is the inventor or founder from the firm/CEO descendent 
implies any founding family corporation if the CEO can be a descendent from the inventor during 
the past decade. 
The study conducted by PWC (2012) found that family businesses are more productive due 
to different facts such as in family firms the interest of the owner in decision making increases be-
cause his/her own money is invested in the business. The same case is observed in the study con-
ducted by Zattoni et al. (2015). They evaluated the impact of family firms on financial performance 
and found that family involvement has positive impact on the firm performance. While, Kachaner, 
Stalk, Jr. and Bloch (2012) concluded that family firms are not productive as compared to non-
family firms because the focus of the family firms is Resilience instead of Performance.  
Bayrakdaroglu (2010) conducted study to investigate the relationship between financial per-
formance and ownership structure of the firms. They select the Turkish firm for analysis. They used 
Return on assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE) and Tobin’s Q as a dependent variable. And ma-
nagerial ownership, free float rate, foreign ownership and ownership concentration are used as inde-
pendent variables. They found that according to the different models, generally the ownership struc-
ture effect the financial performance of the firms. They explained the effect of individual variables 
like free float rate and ownership concentration having a lot of effect on performance of the firms. 
Ownership structure has not significant effect on financial performance of the firm as statistically 
calculation with help of managerial ownership and foreign ownership. 
Theoretical Framework 
There are many concepts about the good and bad viewpoint of efficiency in family firms. 
Dyer (2006) presents family associates factors impacting great compared to low company efficiency 
where the principal-agency concept has a central role. If the providers (managers) and the major 
(owners) have different goals the broker expenses will be serious, although this is not exclusive to 
see relatives associates companies. Jensen and Meckling (1976) discuss that family associates com-
panies are likely to have lower organization cost because the entrepreneurs and the supervisors in 
family associates companies often are the same. The organization expenses are the expenses of the 
tracking of the providers by the fundamentals, and they increase when the company develops. Since 
the need of tracking by the proprietor is not an issue when proprietor and administrator are the same 
person, the organization expenses will not be a problem in founder-led companies. However, family 
associates members control of the administrator could be a reason for higher, or equally great, or-
ganization expenses as non-family companies due to the variations in the interest of close relatives 
in managing roles (Schultze et al., 2001). 
Moreover, through literature review it is quite clear that ownership structure is the major fac-
tor in family firms affecting the firm performance (Barontini, 2006; Pindado et al., 2009; Feng-Li 
and Tsangyao, 2010; Galve-Gorriz and Salas-Fumas, 2014). Moreover, agency theory has been 
widely used by authors studying the impact of family firms on firm value and performance. This is 
logical because in family firms the conflict of interest between owners and employee affects the per-
formance of the firm. Furthermore, the rationale for controlling variables have been discussed after 
the conceptual framework given below. 
 
Methodology 
According to Kothari (2009) population can be referred all those things which are under in-
vestigation in any field of study. If we want to resolve an issue then the data collection from whole 
population would generate more accurate and reliable results but practically it is not possible due to 
time & cost constraints (Zikmund et al., 2012; Saunders et al., 2012; Kothari, 2009). Research will 
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be conducted by using 400 firms listed in Pakistan stock exchange under non-financial sector as 
population. 
In literature, different types of sampling techniques are found and we can normally divide 
them into two major categories known as probability & non-probability sampling (Sekaran & Bou-
gie, 2010). Keeping in view the research objective and aim of the study the simple random sampling 
technique is used to analyze the data. This sampling technique is feasible for our study. Jonker & 
Pennink (2010) stated that in simple random sampling technique overall population has the probabil-
ity of being selected as a sample unit.  
The data obtained from financial statements of the firms listed at Pakistan Stock Exchange. 
In PSX almost 400 firms are listed in non-financial sector. A sample of 120 firms is selected which 
shows 30% of overall population by using the simple random sampling technique. This study con-
sists on panel data of 6 years from 2008 to 2013. Sudman, Bradburn and Schwarz (2010) suggested 
that the sample size of each division of population should include at least 100 respondents. But, in a 
situation in which researcher facing some budget constraints size can be reduced to 80 respondents 
(Aaker, Kumar & Leone, 2001). Furthermore, Hair et al. (2015) stated that sample size should be 
equivalent to 10 times of the number of variables at least. In this way, this research study should 
have sample size equal to 80. As there is limit for minimum sample size only therefore the study has 
used 120 firms because it fulfills the minimum sample size criteria of both scholars Hair et al. 
(2015) and Sudman et al. (2010). 
 
Results and Discussion 
The secondary data was first extracted from financial statements of selected firms. Moreo-
ver, the data was organized in excel sheet then statistical analysis was applied on the organized sec-
ondary data with the help of statistical software Eviews. 
Descriptive Statistics 
The results of descriptive analysis are presented below in table 1 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Analysis 
  Mean S.D Min. Max. 
Family Firm 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Ownership Concentration 34.50 28.35 0 88.22 
Founder Firm / De 0.67 0.47 0 1 
Age 31.03 14.94 1 69 
Size 6.42 0.76 4.25 8.34 
Growth 0.15 0.44 -1.00 3.44 
Leverage 2.14 6.72 18.90 151.64 
Interest Coverage Ratio 9.23 53.92 -273.44 648.71 
ROA 5.38 14.66 -51.62 67.59 
ROE 12.96 71.09 -823.35 601.26 
Tobin's Q 5.02 9.68 0.19 97.24 
 
On the basis of descriptive analysis, it is found that the mode value of Family Firms is 1 
which represents that majority of the firms in sample fall in the category of family firms. Moreover, 
it is also found that mean value of Family Firms is 0.53 which is also greater than 0.5 which verifies 
the above finding i.e. Family Firms in the sample are more than Non-Family Firms. It is also found 
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that all firms in the sample have standard deviation of 50% with minimum value of 0 and maximum 
value of 1 because the study has labelled only two responses for “Family Firms” variable i.e. 
0=Non-Family Firms; 1=Family Firms. It also means that behavior of family firms would be eva-
luated more than non-family firms in this study due to larger number of family firms in the sample. 
According to Table-1 it is found that the mean value of ownership concentration is 34.50% 
with a standard deviation of 28.35%. This shows that family owners have 34.5% shares in non-
financial firms listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange, Pakistan. As it was discussed in definition section 
that a firm would be classified as a family firm if 33% or more than 33% shares are owned by fami-
ly members so, mean value of 34.5% shares show that majority of firms in the sample fall in the cat-
egory of family firms as found by previous variable findings as well. Moreover, the minimum fami-
ly ownership concentration was found to be 0% while maximum ownership concentration was found 
to be 88.22%. Minimum value as 0 shows that sample also contains such firms which have no own-
erships by family members. 
Based on descriptive analysis it is also found that the mode value of Founder/Descendent 
firm is 1 which represents that majority of the firms in sample fall in the category of descendent 
firms as compared to founder firms. Moreover, it is also found that mean value of Found-
er/Descendent firm is 0.67 which is also greater than 0.5 which verifies the above finding i.e. Des-
cendent Firms in the sample are more than Non-Family Firms. It is also found that all firms in the 
sample have standard deviation of 47% with minimum value of 0 and maximum value of 1 because 
the study has labelled only two responses for “Founder/Descendent” variable i.e. 0=Founder Firms; 
1=Descendent Firms. It also means that behavior of descendent firms would be evaluated more than 
founder firms in this study due to larger number of descendent firms in the sample. 
Correlation Analysis 
The results of Correlation analysis are presented below in Table-2. 
 
Table 2. Correlation Analysis 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Family Firm (1) 1           
Ownership 
Conc. 
(2) 0.874 1          
Founder 
Firm/De 
(3) 0.110 0.106 1         
Age (4) -0.093 -0.125 0.572 1        
Size (5) -0.253 -0.225 -0.218 -0.044 1       
Growth (6) 0.043 0.009 -0.146 -0.115 0.110 1      
Leverage (7) -0.015 -0.017 0.014 -0.011 -0.039 -0.011 1     
Interest Cov-
erage Ratio 
(8) -0.159 -0.149 0.028 0.199 0.010 -0.004 -0.004 1    
ROA (9) -0.114 -0.167 -0.029 0.168 0.152 0.226 -0.064 0.303 1   
ROE (10) -0.038 -0.021 -0.011 0.076 0.074 0.020 -0.127 0.157 0.369 1  
Tobin's Q (11) -0.094 -0.112 0.074 0.261 -0.118 -0.008 -0.044 0.391 0.390 0.216 1 
 
Based on correlation analysis it is found that Family Firms and ROA are negatively corre-
lated i.e. -0.1143. This shows that when the value of family firms will increase then the value of 
ROA will decrease and vice versa. This also shows that a unit change in the value of Family Firms 
will change the profitability of ROA by 0.1143 times. It means the increment in the value of Family 
Firms will decrease the profitability of the firm. More appropriately it can be said that a unit in-
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crease in the value of ROA will be observed if we decrease the value of Family Firms by 0.1143. 
So, more the value of Family Firms, less will be its profitability. A similar type of relationship is 
found between Family Firms & ROE, and Family Firms & Tobin’s Q. Both relationships are also 
negatively related i.e. Family Firms & ROE (-0.0381), Family Firms & Tobin’s Q (-0.0938). This 
correlation analysis shows that the impact of family firms is negative on all of the financial perfor-
mance measures whether it is ROA or ROE or Tobin’s Q. The negative correlation value of family 
firms is higher for ROA and it is lower for ROE. 
It is also found that ownership concentration and ROA are also negatively correlated i.e. -
0.1627. This shows that when the value of ownership concentration will increase then the value of 
ROA will decrease and vice versa. This also shows that a unit change in the value of Ownership 
Concentration will change the profitability of ROA by 0.1627 times. It means the increment in the 
value of ownership concentration will decrease the profitability of the firm. More appropriately it 
can be said that a unit increase in the value of ROA will be observed if we decrease the value of 
ownership concentration by 0.1627. So, more the value of ownership concentration, less will be its 
profitability. A similar type of relationship is found between ownership concentration & ROE, and 
ownership concentration & Tobin’s Q. Both relationships are also negatively related i.e. Ownership 
Concentration & ROE (-0.0210), Ownership Concentration & Tobin’s Q (-0.1117). This correlation 
analysis shows that the impact of ownership concentration is negative on all of the financial perfor-
mance measures whether it is ROA or ROE or Tobin’s Q. The negative correlation value of owner-
ship concentration is higher for ROA and it is lower for ROE. 
Results also revealed that Firm Type i.e. Founder/Descendent and ROA are negatively corre-
lated i.e. -0.0289. This shows that when the value of Founder/Descendent firm will increase then the 
value of ROA will decrease and vice versa. This also shows that a unit change in the value of 
Founder/Descendent firm will change the profitability of ROA by 0.0289 times. It means the incre-
ment in the value of Founder/Descendent firm will decrease the profitability of the firm. More ap-
propriately it can be said that a unit increase in the value of ROA will be observed if we decrease the 
value of Founder/Descendent firm by 0.0289. So, higher the value of Founder/Descendent firm, 
lower will be its profitability. A similar type of relationship is found between Founder/Descendent 
firm & ROE while different relationship found between Founder/Descendent firm & Tobin’s Q. The 
relationship between Founder/Descendent firm & ROE is negative (-0.0105) while the relationship 
between Founder/Descendent firm & Tobin’s Q is positive (0.0741). It shows that increase in the 
value of Founder/Descendent firm will decrease ROA & ROE while it will increase the Tobin’s Q 
of the firm. So, the impact of Founder/Descendent firm is not similar on all performance measure 
variables. 
Regression Analysis 
Nine regression models have been developed based on theoretical back ground and literature 
review:  
 
Model-1 
TQit = β0 + β1 (FFIRM) it + β2 (AGE) it + β3 (SIZE) it + β4 (GWT) it + β5 (LEV) it + β6 (ICR) it       
 
Table 3 Regression Analysis Model-1 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
FFIRM -2.560793 1.431680 -1.788663 0.0742 
AGE 0.152904 0.043572 3.509238 0.0005 
SIZE -4.653574 0.755981 -6.155680 0.0000 
GWT 0.457016 0.491174 0.930456 0.3525 
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
LEV -0.012581 0.032043 -0.392631 0.6947 
ICR 0.037946 0.004473 8.484161 0.0000 
Hausman Test Chi2 53.777819 Hausman Test P-Value 0.000000 
R-squared 0.160535 Mean dependent var 1.381826 
Adjusted R-squared 0.152451 S.D. dependent var 5.421472 
S.E. of regression 4.991140 Sum squared resid 15519.85 
F-statistic 19.85663 Prob. (F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
The results of the first model are presented in Table-3. In this model “Tobin’s Q” has been 
taken as dependent variable. The effect of “Tobin’s Q” on firm’s financial performance has been 
measured with the help of multiple regression model. Hausman test is used here to check the feasi-
bility of either random effect model or fixed effect model. The chi-square value for this model is 
53.777 with 5 as degree of freedom. Moreover, the p-value (0.0000) confirms the usage of fixed ef-
fect model instead random effect model. It is found that the coefficient value of FFIRM is -2.560793 
which clearly shows that FFIRM is negatively correlated with Tobin’s Q. Furthermore, it is also 
found that the results are insignificant for this model because the p-value (0.0742) in this model is 
greater than α (0.05). These findings also suggest that Family Firms will not affect the value of 
companies in Pakistan. 
 
Model-2 
TQit = β0 + β1 (OCON) it + β2 (AGE) it + β3 (SIZE) it + β4 (GWT) it + β5 (LEV) it + β6 (ICR) it 
 
Table 4 Regression Analysis Model-2 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
OCON -0.045178 0.025139 -1.797116 0.0728 
AGE 0.150560 0.043679 3.446947 0.0006 
SIZE -4.615813 0.751838 -6.139373 0.0000 
GWT 0.445535 0.491112 0.907196 0.3647 
LEV -0.012715 0.032043 -0.396816 0.6916 
ICR 0.037988 0.004471 8.495854 0.0000 
Hausman Test Chi2 53. 827763 Hausman Test P-Value 0.000000
R-squared 0.160569 Mean dependent var 1.382269
Adjusted R-squared 0.152485 S.D. dependent var 5.421784
S.E. of regression 4.991325 Sum squared resid 15521.00
F-statistic 19.86164 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
 
The results of the second model are presented in Tabel-4. In this model “Tobin’s Q” has 
been taken as dependent variable. The effect of “Tobin’s Q” on firm’s financial performance has 
been measure with the help of multiple regression model. Hausman test is used here to check the 
feasibility of either random effects model or fixed effects model. The chi-square value for this mod-
el is 53.827 with 5 as degree of freedom. Moreover, the p-value (0.0000) confirms the usage of fixed 
effect model instead random effect model. It is found that the coefficient value of OCON is -
0.045178 which clearly shows that OCON is negatively correlated with Tobin’s Q. Furthermore, it 
is also found that the results are insignificant for this model because the p-value (0.0728) in this 
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model is greater than α (0.05). These findings also suggest that Ownership Concentration will not 
affect the value of companies in Pakistan. 
 
Model-3 
TQit = β0 + β1 (F-DFIRM) it + β2 (AGE) it + β3 (SIZE) it + β4 (GWT) it + β5 (LEV) it + β6 (ICR) it 
 
Table 5 Regression Analysis Model-3 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
F_DFIRM -4.323043 1.781843 -2.426164 0.0155 
AGE 0.227419 0.051643 4.403720 0.0000 
SIZE -4.780841 0.758108 -6.306281 0.0000 
GWT 0.421204 0.491131 0.857619 0.3914 
LEV -0.010627 0.032047 -0.331603 0.7403 
ICR 0.038076 0.004467 8.523443 0.0000 
Hausman Test Chi2 53. 827763 Hausman Test P-Value 0.000000 
R-squared 0.163805 Mean dependent var 1.391160 
Adjusted R-squared 0.155752 S.D. dependent var 5.428054 
S.E. of regression 4.987459 Sum squared resid 15496.97 
F-statistic 20.34022 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
The results of the third model are presented in Table-5. In this model “Tobin’s Q” has been 
taken as dependent variable. The effect of “Tobin’s Q” on firm’s financial performance has been 
measure with the help of multiple regression model. Hausman test is used here to check the feasibili-
ty of either random effects model or fixed effects model. The chi-square value for this model is 
52.787 with 5 as degree of freedom. Moreover, the p-value (0.0000) confirms the usage of fixed ef-
fect model instead random effect model. It is found that the coefficient value of F_DFIRM is -
4.323043 which clearly shows that F_DFIRM is negatively correlated with Tobin’s Q. Furthermore, 
it is also found that the results are insignificant for this model because the p-value (0.0155) in this 
model is less than α (0.05). These findings suggest that Family and Descendent will affect the value 
of companies in Pakistan. 
 
Model-4 
ROAit = β0 + β1 (FFIRM) it + β2 (AGE) it + β3 (SIZE) it + β4 (GWT) it + β5 (LEV) it + β6 (ICR) it 
 
Table 6 Regression Analysis Model-4 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
FFIRM -2.362173 1.039178 -2.273116 0.0234 
AGE 0.128655 0.034800 3.697018 0.0002 
SIZE 0.192017 0.206686 0.929027 0.3532 
GWT 7.958371 1.217829 6.534882 0.0000 
LEV -0.137979 0.079001 -1.746559 0.0812 
ICR 0.074200 0.010054 7.380106 0.0000 
Hausman Test Chi2 23.602306 Hausman Test P-Value 0.000312 
R-squared 0.177944 Mean dependent var 5.383381 
Adjusted R-squared 0.171357 S.D. dependent var 14.66366 
S.E. of regression 13.34830 Sum squared resid 111182.5 
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
F-statistic 23.44534 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
The results of the fourth model are presented in Table-6. In this model “ROA” has been tak-
en as dependent variable. The effect of “ROA” on firm’s financial performance has been measured 
with the help of multiple regression model. Hausman test is used here to check the feasibility of ei-
ther random effects model or fixed effects model. The chi-square value for this model is 23.602 with 
5 as degree of freedom. Moreover, the p-value (0.0003) confirms the usage of fixed effect model 
instead random effect model. It is found that the coefficient value of FFIRM is -2.362173 which 
clearly shows that FFIRM is negatively correlated with ROA. Furthermore, it is also found that the 
results are significant for this model because the p-value (0.0234) in this model is less than α (0.05). 
These findings also suggest that ownership structure of firms will affect the financial performance of 
companies in Pakistan. 
 
Model-5 
ROAit = β0 + β1 (OCON) it + β2 (AGE) it + β3 (SIZE) it + β4 (GWT) it + β5 (LEV) it + β6 (ICR) it     
 
Table 7 Regression Analysis Model-5 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
OCON -0.061084 0.018124 -3.370341 0.0008 
AGE 0.125417 0.034621 3.622617 0.0003 
SIZE 0.340278 0.213491 1.593874 0.1115 
GWT 7.854582 1.210576 6.488304 0.0000 
LEV -0.138299 0.078614 -1.759211 0.0790 
ICR 0.073067 0.009984 7.318183 0.0000 
Hausman Test Chi2 23.201913 Hausman Test P-Value 0.000343 
R-squared 0.185956 Mean dependent var 5.383381 
Adjusted R-squared 0.179433 S.D. dependent var 14.66366 
S.E. of regression 13.28309 Sum squared resid 110098.9 
F-statistic 32.34423 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
The results of the fifth model are presented in Table-7. In this model “ROA” has been taken 
as dependent variable. The effect of “ROA” on firm’s financial performance has been measured 
with the help of multiple regression model. Hausman test is used here to check the feasibility of ei-
ther random effects model or fixed effects model. The chi-square value for this model is 23.202 with 
5 as degree of freedom. Moreover, the p-value (0.0003) confirms the usage of fixed effect model 
instead random effect model. It is found that the coefficient value of OCON is -0.061084 which 
clearly shows that OCON is negatively correlated with ROA. Furthermore, it is also found that the 
results are significant for this model because the p-value (0.0008) in this model is less than α (0.05). 
These findings also suggest that ownership concentration of firms will affect the financial perfor-
mance of companies in Pakistan. 
 
Model-6 
ROAit = β0 + β1 (F-DFIRM) it + β2 (AGE) it + β3 (SIZE) it + β4 (GWT) it + β5 (LEV) it + β6 (ICR) it    
Table 8 Regression Analysis Model-6 
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
F_DFIRM -4.393694 1.369929 -3.207242 0.0014 
AGE 0.212591 0.043800 4.853698 0.0000 
SIZE 0.052599 0.190546 0.276045 0.7826 
GWT 7.509264 1.215663 6.177093 0.0000 
LEV -0.130347 0.078724 -1.655745 0.0983 
ICR 0.075810 0.009917 7.644328 0.0000 
Hausman Test Chi2 22.746050 Hausman Test P-Value 0.000421 
R-squared 0.184579 Mean dependent var 5.383381 
Adjusted R-squared 0.178045 S.D. dependent var 14.66366 
S.E. of regression 13.29432 Sum squared resid 110285.1 
F-statistic 19.12132 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
The results of the sixth model are presented in Table-8. In this model “ROA” has been taken 
as dependent variable. The effect of “ROA” on firm’s financial performance has been measured 
with the help of multiple regression model. Hausman test is used here to check the feasibility of ei-
ther random effects model or fixed effects model. The chi-square value for this model is 22.746 with 
5 as degree of freedom. Moreover, the p-value (0.0004) confirms the usage of fixed effect model 
instead random effect model. It is found that the coefficient value of F_DFIRM is -4.393694 which 
clearly shows that F_DFIRM is negatively correlated with ROA. Furthermore, it is also found that 
the results are significant for this model because the p-value (0.0014) in this model is less than α 
(0.05). These findings also suggest that firm type i.e. founder/descendent firm will affect the finan-
cial performance of companies in Pakistan. 
 
Model-7 
ROEit = β0 + β1 (FFIRM) it + β2 (AGE) it + β3 (SIZE) it + β4 (GWT) it + β5 (LEV) it + β6 (ICR) it      
 
Table 9 Regression Analysis Model-7 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
FFIRM -2.137871 1.065366 -2.006700 0.0452 
AGE 0.118492 0.035677 3.321290 0.0009 
SIZE 0.240478 0.211895 1.134892 0.2569 
GWT 8.156636 1.248519 6.533047 0.0000 
LEV -0.145776 0.080991 -1.799888 0.0724 
ICR 0.074779 0.010307 7.254869 0.0000 
Hausman Test Chi2 22.373987 Hausman Test P-Value 0.000423 
R-squared 0.171300 Mean dependent var 5.508921 
Adjusted R-squared 0.164660 S.D. dependent var 14.97281 
S.E. of regression 13.68469 Sum squared resid 116856.9 
F-statistic 27.23423 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
The results of the seventh model are presented in Table-9. In this model “ROE” has been 
taken as dependent variable. The effect of “ROE” on firm’s financial performance has been meas-
ured with the help of multiple regression model. Hausman test is used here to check the feasibility of 
either random effects model or fixed effects model. The chi-square value for this model is 22.374 
with 5 as degree of freedom. Moreover, the p-value (0.0004) confirms the usage of fixed effect 
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model instead random effect model. It is found that the coefficient value of FFIRM is -2.137871 
which clearly shows that FFIRM is negatively correlated with ROE. Furthermore, it is also found 
that the results are significant for this model because the p-value (0.0452) in this model is less than α 
(0.05). These findings also suggest that family firms will affect the financial performance of compa-
nies in Pakistan. 
 
Model-8 
ROEit = β0 + β1 (OCON) it + β2 (AGE) it + β3 (SIZE) it + β4 (GWT) it + β5 (LEV) it + β6 (ICR) it      
 
Table 10 Regression Analysis Model-8 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
OCON -0.059504 0.018580 -3.202570 0.0014 
AGE 0.115476 0.035492 3.253623 0.0012 
SIZE 0.397346 0.218863 1.815504 0.0699 
GWT 8.064487 1.241035 6.498193 0.0000 
LEV -0.146031 0.080592 -1.811976 0.0705 
ICR 0.073440 0.010236 7.174983 0.0000 
Hausman Test Chi2 21.991258 Hausman Test P-Value 0.000564 
R-squared 0.179440 Mean dependent var 5.508921 
Adjusted R-squared 0.172865 S.D. dependent var 14.97281 
S.E. of regression 13.61732 Sum squared resid 115709.1 
F-statistic 20.34022 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
The results of the eighth model are presented in Table-8. In this model “ROE” has been tak-
en as dependent variable. The effect of “ROE” on firm’s financial performance has been measured 
with the help of multiple regression model. Hausman test is used here to check the feasibility of ei-
ther random effects model or fixed effects model. The chi-square value for this model is 21.991 with 
5 as degree of freedom. Moreover, the p-value (0.0005) confirms the usage of fixed effect model 
instead random effect model. It is found that the coefficient value of OCON is -0.059504 which 
clearly shows that OCON is negatively correlated with ROE. Furthermore, it is also found that the 
results are significant for this model because the p-value (0.0014) in this model is less than α (0.05). 
These findings also suggest that ownership structure will affect the financial performance of compa-
nies in Pakistan. 
 
Model-9 
ROEit = β0 + β1 (F-DFIRM) it + β2 (AGE) it + β3 (SIZE) it + β4 (GWT) it + β5 (LEV) it + β6 (ICR) it       
 
Table 11 Regression Analysis Model-9 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
F_DFIRM -3.764167 1.406649 -2.675981 0.0076 
AGE 0.190306 0.044974 4.231471 0.0000 
SIZE 0.112332 0.195654 0.574137 0.5661 
GWT 7.765614 1.248248 6.221211 0.0000 
LEV -0.139276 0.080834 -1.722983 0.0854 
ICR 0.076323 0.010183 7.495162 0.0000 
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Hausman Test Chi2 21.649950 Hausman Test P-Value 0.000645 
R-squared 0.175415 Mean dependent var 5.508921 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.168808 S.D. dependent var 14.97281 
S.E. of regression 13.65067 Sum squared resid 116276.6 
F-statistic 20.34022 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
The results of the ninth model are presented in Table-11. In this model “ROE” has been tak-
en as dependent variable. The effect of “ROE” on firm’s financial performance has been measure 
with the help of multiple regression model. Hausman test is used here to check the feasibility of ei-
ther random effects model or fixed effects model. The chi-square value for this model is 21.649 with 
5 as degree of freedom. Moreover, the p-value (0.0006) confirms the usage of fixed effect model 
instead random effect model. It is found that the coefficient value of OCON is -3.764167 which 
clearly shows that F_DFIRM is negatively correlated with ROE. Furthermore, it is also found that 
the results are significant for this model because the p-value (0.0076) in this model is less than α 
(0.05). These findings also suggest that firm type i.e. founder/descendent will affect the financial 
performance of companies in Pakistan. 
  
Conclusion and Recommendations 
Conclusion 
This study is conducted in non-financial sector of Pakistan. Data of 120 firms from the popu-
lation of 400 firms listed at PSX have been extracted by using simple random sampling technique. 
The major conclusion drawn from this study is about the firm performance of family firms as com-
pared to non-family firms. On the basis of results obtained from this study it is concluded that non-
family firms are performing better than family firms in Pakistan. The study evaluates the perfor-
mance of 120 firms (Family = 55, Non-Family = 65) over the period of 6 years (2008-2013). The 
study has used three proxy variables i.e. Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE to find the above concluding 
remarks. The study found significant results with the help of Tobin’s Q, ROA, and ROE. This re-
search has been successful in finding the answer to all research questions. In response to first re-
search question it is concluded that non-family firms perform better than family firms. The same 
answer goes true for second research question as well. In response to third question it is also found 
that founder firms are performing better in Pakistan than descendant firms. In response to last re-
search question it is concluded that firm type, age and size are the important determinants of firm 
performance which is normally measured with the help of ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q. 
Non-family controlled firms are perform better in Pakistan market. One reason behind that 
professional managers not run the family firms. Professional managers are titled for very tough time 
for any firm. But in the good time families enjoyed the ownership and having full controlled on the 
firm’s management. Ownership concentration or ownership influence are very much effected on the 
firm performance. The study shows that firms having low ownership concentration of one family, 
the firms perform better and if the firms having high ownership concentration of a single family that 
time firm’s performance are low. The rising of ownership concentration of a single family in the 
firm mean negative impact on firm performance.  
The gap in performance of the firms between the family and non-family firms are the differ-
ence in skills among the professional managers and family managers. In fact the professional man-
ager are selected from lot of competition and larger pool talent. And the other side family managers 
are the family members of the existing authority. Owner manager having a position as a top manager 
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or final authority and then top manager want to retain that position for whole coming family. These 
manners are less productive and family controlled firm’s shows low productivity as compared to 
non-family businesses.  
Anderson and Reeb (2003) shows that family firms give better performance as compared to 
non-family controlled firms. But this study checked the concave relationship among the family 
ownership and performance of the firm. The firm’s shows negative relationship and negative effect 
on performance when the ownership concentration about 30%. After about 60% the family firms 
give performance than to non-family firms. The study shows that in his sample family owned firms 
mostly consider who’s firms having more 50% family ownership concentration. The study also 
shows that almost 74% family controlled firms have not any other owner. These types of forms hav-
ing a 100% ownership. So my results are consistent with the findings of Anderson and reed. 
Recommendations and Directions for Future Research 
Results obtained from this research study strongly recommends that BoDs in Pakistani firms 
should understand the importance of ownership concentration for enhanced firm performance. BoDs 
should prefer the establishment of non-family firms. Moreover SECP should encourage the estab-
lishment of non-family firms as compared to family firms which will not only boost the firm per-
formance but will also contribute the country’s GDP growth effectively. It is also recommended that 
board of family firms should incorporate such methods which can eradicate the limitations of family 
firms as compared to non-family firms. It is also recommended that minority shareholder activism 
must be encouraged by SECP which can also reduce the limitations of family firms. 
For future research it is recommended that researchers should incorporate the role of regulat-
ing authorities to minimize the negative effects of family firms on financial performance of the 
firms. Researchers can also choose other sectors e.g. financial sector, banking sector etc. to under-
stand the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance in Pakistan. It is also recommend-
ed that researchers should increase the sample size to either strengthen the results of previous studies 
or negate them. Moreover, researchers can use other proxy variables such as board structure and 
board size to identify the impact on firm performance. 
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